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Bensabat: Open Meetings in Higher Education--An Analysis and a Proposal for

OPEN MEETINGS IN HIGHER EDUCATION- AN
ANALYSIS AND A PROPOSAL FOR FLORIDA
INTRODUCTION

Because no public right to attend governmental meetings existed at common
law,' the American Constitutional Convention was conducted in secrecy. 2 As
government grew, 3 Americans sought access to the democratic decision-making
process.- Although a constitutional right of access to government 5 may be
emerging,6 the growth in the public's right to attend governmental meetings
may be attributed to statutory rather than constitutional developments.7 All
fifty states8 and the federal Congress 9 have enacted statutes allowing public
attendance of governmental meetings.

1.

F. THAYER, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PRESS 27-32

2.

Id. See also J. WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY 9 (1964).

(4th ed. 1962).

3.

F. THAYER, supra note 1, at 33-40.
H. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW 180-83 (1953). See also, 9 WRITINGS OF THOMAS
MADISON 103 (Hunt ed. 1910) ("A popular Government, without popular information, or the

4.

means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or Tragedy; or perhaps both.'), cited in
Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fights for the "Right to Know", 75 HARv. L. REv.
1187, 1200 n.10 (1962).
5. The first amendment has been held to protect the right to receive information from
a willing source. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375-76 (1977); Virginia State
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizen's Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976). In
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978), the Supreme Court explained its position on the public right of access to information: "a public entitlement to
information mean[s] no more than that the government cannot restrain communication of
whatever information the media acquire - and which they elect to reveal." Id. at 833.
6. Support for a constitutional right of access comes primarily from the media and
scholars. The media has been very influential in pressing the courts for access to government. See H. CROSS, supra note 4, at vii. Scholarly support for a constitutional right of access
began in the 1950's. See, e.g., id.; F. THAYER, supra note 1, at 29; Parks, The Open Government Principle:Applying the Right to Know Under the Constitution, 26 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
1 (1957); Yankwich, Legal Implications of, and Barriers to, The Right to Know, 40 MARQ.
L. REv. 3 (1956).
7. The United States Supreme Court has held there is no constitutional right of access
to government-held information. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974). Accord Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978). In Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Court noted: "the press is regularly excluded from meetings . . . of official bodies in executive session." Id. at 685. See Litde & Tompkins, Open
Government Laws: An Insider's View, 53 N.C.L. REv. 459, 461-64 (1975); Note, The Federal
"Government in the Sunshine Act": A Public Access Compromise, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 881, 88283 (1977).
8. ALA. CODE. tit. 14, § 13-5-1 (1975); ALAsKtA STAT. § 44.62.310-.312 (Supp. 1975); AIuZ.
R v. STAT. ANN. § 38-431 to 431.08 (Supp. 1976); ARE. STAT. ANN. § 12-2801 to -2807 (Supp.
1976); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 11120-31 (West Supp. 1976); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 624-6-401 to
-402, § 29-9-101 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-21 to -21b (Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 29, § 5109 (1975); FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1981); GA. CODE AN*4. § 40-3301 to -3302 (1975);
HAW. REv. STAT. § 92-1 to -13, § 93-41 (Supp. 1975); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 102, §§ 41-46 (Smith-
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Public demands for government accountability-0 and the recognition that
government and its agencies exist to serve the sovereign people,11 prompted
passage of these open meeting statutes. Open meeting law proponents
contend that public and media presence will foster desirable changes in the
governmental process. These include: increased acceptance of and confidence
in governmental actions;1 2 reduction in the frequency of inadequately informed,' s corrupt or casual decision-making;' 4 and a more informed citizenry.'5
Hurd Supp. 1976-77); IND. STAT. ANN. § 5-14-1-1 to -6 (Burns 1974); IOwA CODE ANN. § 28A.1-8
(Supp. 1976); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4317 to -4320 (Supp. 1975); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.805.991 (Baldwin 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42:5-:8 (West 1965), as amended, § 42:9 (West
Supp. 1976); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 401-10 (Supp. 1976-77); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41,
§ 14 (1975); art. 23A, § 8 (Supp. 1976); art. 25, § 5 (1973); MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 30A, § llA-B,
ch. 34, § 9F-G § 10, ch. 39, § 23A-C (Supp. 1976); MucH. COmp. LAws ANN. § 15.261-.273 (1981);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471.705 (Supp. 1976); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2541-1 to -15 (Supp. 1976); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 610.010-.030 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1976); MONT. REv. CODES A-NN. § 82-3401 to
3403 (Supp. 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-1401 to -1414 (Cum. Supp. 1976); Nmv. REv. SrAT.
§ 1241.020 (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:2 (Supp. 1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-12 (West
1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 10-15-1 (Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.12 (Supp. 1980);
N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAw § 98 (McKinney Supp. 1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 301 (West Supp.
1979-80); OR. REV. STAT. § 192.630 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 262 (Purdon Supp. 1979-80);
R.1. GEN. LAw: § 42-46-3 (1977); S.C. CODE § 80-4-60 (Supp. 1979); S.D. Co=r=Lrn LAws ANN.
§ 1-25-1 (1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-4-3 (Supp. 1979); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 6252-17
(Vernon Supp. 1980); UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-4-3 (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 312
(Supp. 1979); VA. CODE § 2.1-343 (1979); WMsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 42.30-030 (1972); W. VA.
CODE § 6-9A-3 (1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.83 (West Supp. 1979-80); Wyo. STAT. § 9-11-103

(1977).
9. Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5526 (1978). See Note, supra note 7.
10. See generally, Hollow & Ennis, The People's Business Goes Public, 42 TENN. L. REV.
527 (1975); Project, Citizen's Information and the Rights of Citizens: State and Proposed
Federal Open Meeting Laws, 73 U. Mucm. L. REv. 971, 1187 (1975); Note, Government in the
Sunshine: Promise or Placebo?, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 361 (1971).

11. The motivating policy is best summarized in California's Brown Act, CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 54950 (West 1969): "The people of this state do not yield their sovereignty to the
agencies which serve them. The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public
servants the right to decide what is good for the people to know and what is not good for
them to know. The people insist upon remaining informed so that they may retain control
over the instruments they have created." Many open meeting statutes contain similar statements of policy. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 67-2340 (Supp. 1976); IL. REV. STAT. ch. 102, § 41
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); Miss. CODE ANN. § 25-41-1 (Supp. 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 841408
(Cum. Supp. 1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. i 10-4-7 (1976).
12. Wickham, Let the Sun Shine In!., 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 480, 488 (1973); Comment,

Open Meeting Laws: An Analysis and a Proposal, 45 Miss. L.J. 1151, 1161 (1974). Accord
Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 1974).
13. J. WxCixNs, supra note 2, at 19-20. Professor Wiggins lists seven reasons to insist upon
public access: (1) taxpaying citizens have an absolute interest in legislative deliberations;
(2) the people must be informed of their representatives' actions as they have not yielded
their sovereignty; (3) open proceedings enlist the intelligence of the whole community; (4) to
increase public participation in government; (5) open proceedings protect against fraud and
mistake; (6) to protect the honest official from unfounded rumors; and (7) to increase the
accuracy of legislative fact-finding. Id.
14. F. THAYER, supra note 1, at 165. Simon, The Application of State Sunshine Laws to
Institutions of Higher Education, 4 J.C. & U.L. 82, 86-87 (1977).
15. Note, supranote 4, at 1201.
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Through such improvements voters are better equipped to evaluate governmental action.16

Open meeting opponents emphasize the need for public officials to deliberate frankly and form tentative positions free from public opinion pressure.' 7 Public attendance may make officials reluctant to admit their ignorance
or to take unpopular but necessary positions.'1 Finally, public intrusion may
impair the efficient administration of government and its agencies. 19
Most open meeting statutes fail to expressly include or exclude state universities from the open meeting requirement. 2° This legislative oversight has
forced the judiciary to determine whether state universities are included
within the ambit of the statutes.2' As more students are seeking higher education at public universities,22 the universities have burgeoned into large, expensive state agencies. 23 Thus, the public has demanded 24 access to meetings
5
where university policies are formulated.'
This Note will examine state appellate court decisions concerning the
application of open meeting statutes to higher education. The few Florida cases
specifically applying Florida's open meeting statute, the Sunshine Law, 26 to
16. J. WIGGINS, supra note 2, at 19. See supra note 13.
17. Note, supra note 4, at 1202. The author suggests further that public officials would
waste time making speeches and would be reluctant to publicly disagree, and that "there
are many details, ramifications, and opinions that no sound administrator would care to
express in public." Id.
18. Wickham, supra note 12, at 482. One commentator proposes the following as valid
reasons for secrecy: personal and property rights of individuals, risks of impairing future
government actions by drying up resources, false charges against officials, law violations and
investigations, the need for frank deliberation, unfair economic gains, and military secrets.
See generally Parks, supra note 6. Many of these considerations are expressly exempted in
the states' open meeting statutes.
19. See Rights in Conflict- Reconciling Privacy with the Public's Right to Know, 63 L
LIBR. J. 551 (1970) (William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, panelist).
20. But see, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 29-9-101(3) (1977); IDAHo CODE § 67-2342 (Supp.
1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 261 (Purdon Supp. 1979).
21. The threshold inquiry is referred to as entity coverage and requires the courts to
determine that institutions of higher education are governmental entities to which the
open meeting statute applies. See Simon, supra note 14, at 91 (breadth of entity coverage).
22. See Smith, Student Rights of Passage A Full or Limited Partnershipin University
Governance, 7 J.L. & EDuc. 65, 73 (1980).
23. See CARNEGIE COMMISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, THE STATES AND HIGHER EDUCATION

26-40 (1970).
24. Gellhorn & Boyer, Government and Education: The University as a Regulated Industry, 1977 ARIz. ST. L.J. 569, 571 ("Today's colleges and universities are no longer (if they
ever were) isolated institutions standing apart from the main currents of society.").
25. Id.
26. FLA, STAT. § 286.011 (1981). The statute states in part:
"(1) All meetings of any board or commission of any state agency or authority or
of any agency of authority of any county, municipal corporation or any political
subdivision, except as otherwise provided in the constitution, at which official acts
are to be taken are declared to be public meetings open to the public at all times,
and no resolution, rule, regulation or formal action shall be considered binding except
as taken or made at such meeting."
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higher education, will be examined in greater detail. Through a study of
Sunshine Law litigation the conflicting policies peculiar to higher education
will be analyzed. This Note will conclude by proposing a statutory scheme to
implement the Sunshine Law in higher education.
APPLYING OPEN-MEETING STATUTES
TO HIGHER EDUCATION

Applying open meeting statutes to institutions of higher education requires
the judiciary to review university meeting policies and practices. Courts have
27
historically abstained from such intrusions into university self-governance,
recognizing the university's need for independence 8 from external pressures in
order to fulfill its academic functions. 29 When courts have ventured into this
area they have, for the most part, protected universities against undue legislative coercion.30 Nonetheless, the courts have frequently reviewed university
decisions in order to implement the fourteenth amendment guarantees of due
32
process-' and equal protection.
Academic freedom may be viewed as a category of institutional independence. Academic freedom focuses on the scholarly activities engaged in at
27. Judicial restraint and unwillingness to review university decisions characterized the
courts' attitude up until the 1950's. See, e.g., Hartigan v. Board of Regents of W. Va. U., 49
W. Va. 14, 38 S.E. 698 (1901) (judicial review of university firings would be little less than
usurpation). Accord Stetson U. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 516, 102 So. 637, 640 (1925). See Note,
Judicial Review of the University-Student Relationship: Expression and Governance, 26
STAN. L. REv. 95, 117 (1973).
28. Brubacher, The Impact of the Courts on HigherEducation, 2 J.L. & Enuc. 267 (1973).
"Institutional autonomy is the surest guardian of academic freedom. To shift from
rules and procedures that academic institutions have evolved as central to the
teaching-learning process and to put academic discipline, appointment, grading, and
all manner of educational requirements at the mercy of the courts would mean,
quite simply, that civil jurisdiction over intellectual inquiry would be complete."
Id. (quoting James A. Pickens, former President, Cornell University).
29. R. MAClvim, ACADEMmC FaREDOM iN Ouo TIME, 112-22 (1955) (political pressures
and controls will compromise academic functions). See Note, Academic Freedom: How Does
FloridaStand?, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 564, 567 (1965).
30. See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (loyalty oath statute required for all
state personnel including state university personnel. declared void on vagueness grounds);
,Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (loyalty oath statute required of all state
personnel, including state university professors offends due process since it failed to distinguish knowing from innocent activity).
31. See, e.g., Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (due process in medical
school expulsion); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 569 (1975) (entitlement to procedural due process
in secondary education); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (nontenured faculty right
to procedural due process). See, Developments, Academic Freedom, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1045,
1077-81 (1968). See also Brubacher, supra note 28, at 270-74.
32. rThe Supreme Court changed the structure of society and public education by enforcing the equal protection clause in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also
Regents of U. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312
(1974) (vacated per curiam as moot); Morris, Equal Educational Opportunity, Constitutional
Uniformity and the Defunis Remand, 50 WASH. L. REv. 565, 566-78 (1975).
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colleges and universities, 3 while institutional independence is a broader concept
that advocates complete university autonomy. 34 In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,35
the Supreme Court held that a university professor has a first amendment
right to refuse to discuss his beliefs and the contents of his lectures at legislative investigations into subversive conduct. 36 Sweezy and subsequent cases have
established that the first amendment rights of speech and association protect
the rights of faculty and students to teach, to advocate, and to study3 7 free
from internal and external sanction.3 8 Courts have thus sought to ensure academic freedom by protecting individual first amendment rights.39 A similar
institutional right to autonomy has not been recognized; instead, the statutory
or constitutional provisions creating state institutions of higher education establish the degree of autonomy they are accorded. 40 In recognizing the constitutional underpinnings of academic freedom, the judiciary has not altered the
constitutionally or statutorily authorized degree of autonomy accorded to
41
state institutions of higher learning.
33. See Comment, Preventing Unnecessary Intrusion on University Autonomy, A Proposed
Academic Freedom Privilege, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 1538, 1546 (1981); Note, supra note 29, at
564-66.
34. The Carnegie Commission suggests that complete autonomy is necessary in spending,
work assignments, salaries, promotions, selection of faculty, students and administrators,
academic standards, academic freedom policies, growth rate and administration of service
and research functions. CARNEGIE COMISSON ON Hxcict EDUCATION, supra note 23, at 192.
35. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
36. Id. at 254. The Court held that the fourteenth amendment guarantees protect the
professor's first amendment rights. Id. The Supreme Court noted that "for society's good...
inquiries . . . speculation . . . stimulation in others of reflection . . . must be left as un-

fettered as possible. Political pressures must abstain from intrusion into this activity of
freedom .
d. at 261.
37. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513-15 (1969)
(students' right to peaceful, nondisruptive protest); Keyeshian v. Board of Regents, 385
U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (the university classroom should be the marketplace of ideas); Keefe v.
Ganakos, 418 F.2d 359, 362-63 (1st Cir. 1969) (teacher may use profane language for instructional purposes); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 354 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (academic
freedom is itself a first amendment right). See generally Van Alystyne, The Constitutional
Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DuKE L.J. 841.
38. See Project, Education and the Law: State Interests and Individual Rights, 74 MIcH.
L. REv. 1373, 1447-54 (1976). See also Hollister, A View of Some First Amendment Rights of
College Students, 2 J.L. & EDuc. 637 (1973). The concept, academic freedom, is not well
defined by the nation's judiciary. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in Sweezy, stated four basic
rights in academic freedom include "who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be
taught, and who may be admitted to study," 354 U.S. at 263. Cf. Comment, supra note 33, at
1544-47.
39. See R. MACIVER, supra note 29, at 112. See also White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222 (Cal.
1975) (undercover police agents planted in classrooms for non-specific surveillance violates
the faculty's first amendment rights of speech & association).
40. See Project, supra note 38, at 1375-80; Note, supra note 29, at 573-77. See also infra
notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
41. The judiciary abstains from intrusion into the academic functions of the universities.
Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 92 (1972). In this way academic freedom and
institutional autonomy are related. However, in In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981),
the court held the tenure selection process is not privileged by academic freedom. Id. at 431.
The due process right of the professor whose tenure was denied was held distinct from and
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Open meeting legislation may conflictwith both institutional independence
and academic freedom. 4 2 When such statutes affect institutional autonomy they
must be harmonized with the provisions of state law that create and afford
autonomy to the state colleges and universities. Similarly, when such legislation infringes upon the individual's right to academic freedom the courts
must strike a balance between them.
Issues Unresolved by the Open Meeting Statutes
Courts have struggled with the application and interpretation of the open
meeting statutes. This is partly due to the statutes' recent vintage;4 3 it is perhaps
due in greater part to the difficulty courts have had in determining which
meetings the statutes require to be open.- States have enacted a number of
different statutory schemes to indicate when public access will be required.Thus, meetings have been openedl6 when "governing bodies" are involved,
47
when "official acts" are taken, or when "public funds" are used.
The decentralization of university decision-making authority complicates
the application of open meeting statutes. 48 The central state educational board
superior to any academic concerns. Id. See also United Carolina Bank v. Board of Regents,
665 F.2d 553, 564-65 (5th Cir. 1982) (tenure denial based on exercise of first amendment

rights is unconstitutional).
42. See Gellhorn & Boyer, supra note 24, at 572. The authors suggest three reasons for
university resistance: human nature resists rapid change; general economic conditions and a
cost squeeze; and fear that social and political pressures indicate distrust of the institutions.
Id.

43. In 1962, 26 states had open meeting statutes. They were then a "novelty." See Note,
supra note 4, at 1204-05.

44. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
45.

At the Nineteenth Annual Conference of University Attorneys it was suggested that

federal preemption might be a solution to the existing statutory confusion and disparities
among the states. Nowhere else does this suggestion appear to have been made. Edwards &
Sherry, Operating with State Sunshine Laws, 6 J.C. & U.L. 85, 89 (1978) (Outlines of Conference Presentations).
46. The open meeting statutes only commonly assure some public right of attendance
at government meetings. Most statutes do not include the judiciary or the executive branches.
See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, OPEN MEETINGS: EXCEPTIONS TO STATE
LAws 58-67 (1979) [hereinafter cited as EXCEPTIONS]; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEys
GENERAL, OPEN MEETINGS: TY'PES OF BODIES COvERED 47-48 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
TYPE]. Some states do not specifically require open meetings of the state legislature. See,
e.g., ILL. REr. STAT. ch. 102, § 42 (1975). See also TYPES, supra, at 49-54. The scope of the
open meeting statute is very much a reflection of the political and economic pressures in
each state. E.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42.61 (West Supp. 1980) (State Mineral Board not
required to meet openly in certain circumstances).
47. See infra notes 119-36 and accompanying text. Most open meeting statutes require
access to meetings of state agencies, in recognition of the fact that modern governance relies
heavily on such bodies. However, the statutes rarely specify which meetings must be open.
J. WIGGINS, supra note 2, at 11. See also Kraft, Admissions to Public Professional Schools and
Administrative Openness, 29 J. LEGAL EDUc. 52, 55 (1977) ("Thus if the electorate truly wants
to truly exercise its right to control and oversee those who are influential in making decisions
obscure offices in college campuses.").
in its name ... it should watch ...
48. Student activism in the 1960's and 70's demanded more popular control of the university
decision-making process. See Smith, supra note 22, at 73-75. The resulting decentralization

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol34/iss2/4

6

Bensabat: Open Meetings in Higher Education--An Analysis and a Proposal for
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXIV

and university presidents have dispersed their authority to faculty, 49 students, 50
deans, and administrative committees. 1 Determining which university meetings must be open may require a threshold determination of whether the
central state governing board must meet openly. 52 A court may then trace the
delegation of authority to decide if a specific meeting must be open.53 Ascertaining who or what body has the final authority on a subject complicates
the application of open meeting statutes to university meetings. 54 Additionally,
since open meeting statutes generally do not apply to individual officers,
problems exist in determining if a meeting conducted under authority delegated
from a dean or president must be open.55
An effective open meeting statute56 should precisely define the terms which
determine its scope.5 7 Some statutes specifically identify those entities which
must meet openly;58 however, few adequately account for all existing state
60
entities,-9 much less subsequently created ones.
of power has created a complex hierarchy of authority. See Haslam, The Locus of Decision
Making in Colleges and Universities: The Broad Perspective, 1 J.C. & U.L. 241, 242, 246
(1973); O'Neil, Court and Campus - Striking a New Balance, 1 J.C. & U.L. 199 (1973); Russell,
Goal Accountability in Higher Education; Towards a Comprehensive Legal Conception
of the University, 7 J.L. & EDuc. 507, 516 (1978).
49. See Student B. Ass'n v. Byrd, 239 S.E.2d 415 (N.C. 1977); Cathcart v. Anderson, 85
Wash. 2d 102, 530 P.2d 317 (1975).
50. See McLarty v. Board of Regents of U. Sys. of Ga., 200 S.E.2d 117 (Ga. 1972) (student/
faculty committee to allocate fees); Pope v. Parkinson, 48 Ill. App. 3d 797, 363 N.E.2d 438 (4th
Dist. 1977) (student/faculty advisory committee need not meet openly).
51. Smith, supra note 22, at 76-76. See infra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
52. See Shurtz, The University in the Sunshine: Application of the Open Meeting Laws
to the University Setting, 5 J.L. & EDUa 453, 454 (1976). Compare Student B. Ass'n v. Byrd,
239 S.E.2d 415 (N.C. 1977) (State Board of Governors need not meet openly) with Courier
Journal v. University of Louisville, 596 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. App. 1979) (Board of Trustees must
meet openly).
53. See, e.g., Green v. Athletic Council of Iowa State U., 251 N.W.2d 559 (Iowa 1977). The
Iowa court traced the delegation of authority from the Board of Regents to the Athletic
Council and determined it must meet openly. See also T'aws, supra note 46, at 39.
54. TYPEs, supra note 46, at I. In order to have a "meeting" the requisite two or more
persons must be located. Open meeting statutes therefore do not apply to individuals. Id. at
47-48. See Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So. 2d 288, 289 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973) (two or more required).
55. See infra notes 137-47 and accompanying text. See also TYPEs, supra note 46, at 3.
56. See Project, supra note 10, at 1190-211. The following five criteria are proposed as
necessary for a comprehensive statute: (I) a description of which government bodies and
which of those meetings are open; (2) specific subject matter that may be discussed in closed
sessions; (3) citizen standing to enforce; (4) consequences of action wrongly taken in a closed
session; and (5) sanctions for individuals who violate the statute.
57. See Guy & McDonald, Government in the Sunshine: The Status of Open Meetings
and Open Records Laws in North Dakota, 53 N.D.L. Rv. 51, 56 (1976); Hollow & Ennis,
supra note 10, at 537; Wickhorn, Tennessee's Sunshine Law: A Need for Limited Shade and
Clearer Focus, 42 TENN. L. REv. 557, 560-61 (1975); Note, supra note 7, at 886.
58. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13-5-1 (1975); Aruz. REv. STAT. art. 3.1, § 38-431 (Supp. 1976).
59. When Florida enacted the Sunshine Law in 1967, the following Boards or Commissions
existed: 46 Hospital, 14 Pilot Commissions, 20 Mosquito Control, 67 Agricultural Zoning, 49
Drainage, 67 Canvassing, 67 Public Instruction, 55 Soil and Water, 2,649 Precinct Election.
Defendant's Request to Admit, Wood v. Marston, No. 80-825 (Fla. 8th Cir. July 24, 1981),
docketed AF-475 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. Aug. 1981).
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Many statutes use functional standards6' such as "official actions" and
"governing bodies" to define which meetings will be within their purview. 62
The application of such functional criteria to advisory boards or subcommittees with authority limited to making recommendations is unpredictable. 63 A
few state statutes require open meetings of entities that are tax supported or
that spend public funds.64 If expenditure of public funds is the sole criterion,
then state universities are surely included within the statutes' ambit. Arguably,
even private colleges receiving grants are included.05
State Cases Applying Open Meeting
Statutes to HigherEducation
The statutory standard "governing bodies" is a functional one in which
applicability is dependent upon a factual analysis of an entity's powers and
duties. 6 State appellate courts have interpreted the standard variously. In
Student Bar Association v. Byrd,6 7 the North Carolina Supreme Court examined
the state open meeting statute's applicability to the state university's law
faculty meetings. The statute in question has a functional standard requiring
open "official meetings" of entities that are "governing and governmental...
or that act as bodies politic... ."- In order to be subject to the open meeting
60. See FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (1981). Florida's Sunshine Law is a simplistic example of
an enumerative statute as it applies to all "boards or commissions." FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1)
(1981).
Despite the vagueness of the statutory terms, constitutional challenges for vagueness and

overbreadth have been uniformly rejected. See Board of Pub. Instr. of Broward County v.
Doran, 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969); Dorrier v. Dark, 537 S.W2d 888 (Tenn. 1976).
61. This note loosely classifies statutes as enumerative, functional and public funds for
discussion purposes. For other classification schemes, see Simon, supra note 14, at 90-94;
Wickham, supra note 12, at 482-83; Note, supra note 4, at 1205; Comment, supra note 12, at
1151.
62. In addition to enumerating "boards or commissions," the Florida statute only applies
to "official actions." Many statutes similarly have two tests of applicability. See, Project, supra
note 10, at 68. A representative but nonexhaustive list of functional statutes includes: ALA.
CODE § 13-5-1 (1975); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11120-31 (West Supp. 1979); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. '102, §§ 41-46 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 30A, § IIA-B (Supp. 1976);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 471-705 (West 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 610.010-.030 (Vernon 1979); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 143-318.12 (Supp. 1979); OR. REy. STAT. § 192.630 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65,
§ 262 (Purdon Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4402 (Supp. 1979); WAsH. REv. CoDE ANN.
§ 42.30.030 (1980). See also TYPs, supra note 46, at 4-12.
63. See infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
64. E.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 44.62.310 (1976); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 38.431.01 (Supp. 1980);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2805

(1968); KAN.

STAT. ANN.

§ 75-4317 (1977);

MONT.

Ray. CODES

ANN.

§ 82-3402 (Supp. 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-19 (1978); S.C. CODE § 30-4-60 (Supp. 1979);
VA. CODE § 2.1-343 (1979).
65. There has been no attempt as yet to apply open meeting statutes to private institu-

tions, but the possibility exists. See Simon, supra note 14, at 92-93. See generally Hendrickson,
"State Action" and Private Higher Education, 2 J.L. & EDuc. 52 (1973).
66. See Dorrier v. Dark, 537 S.W.2d 888, 893 (Tenn. 1976). See Shurtz, supra note 52, at
454; TYPEs, supra note 46, at 4-6,

67. 293 N.C. 594, 239 S.Ead 415 (1977).
68. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-318.2 (Supp. 1980) "all official meetings of the governing and
governmental... or other subsidiary or component thereof which have or claim authority
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statute, the court required the "body politic" to be acting as a government,
exercising the usual sovereign powers ascribed to governments of taxing, adjudicating controversies, policing, and legislating.69 Therefore, upon finding that
the faculty did not constitute a governing and governmental body, the court
held the statute inapplicable to law faculty meetings.70 By defining "governing
body" restrictively, the court effectively prevented the open meeting statute
from applying to any level of the state university system despite its many
quasi-governmental functions."' The majority acknowledged this result and
further held that the state Board of Governors, which supervises the entire
72
state educational system, is not a governing body.
The dissent, despite its preference for a broader construction of "governing
bodies,"7 3 applied the majority's limited construction of the term, but argued
that the Board of Governors is functionally a governing body because it has
general rule-making, policy, and expenditure authority. 74 Therefore, the
dissenters felt the law faculty, as a component 5 part of the Board of Governors,
should meet openly.76
Many state courts avoid such factual evaluations to determine if the entity
is functionally a governing body. Instead, the determination relies upon
whether the law creating the university granted it governing authority. The
Washington State Supreme Court utilized this approach to determine, unlike
the Byrd court, that the law faculty 77 at the University of Washington is a

" (emphasis supplied).
... or act as bodies politic ..
69. 293 N.C. at 600, 239 S.E.2d at 421. By reading the statute in the conjunctive the
court redefined governing body.
70. Id.
71. Id. The court traced authority from the legislature to the Board of Governors, which
makes all final decisions in the university system, Accordingly, determinations at any lower
level in the university hierarchy are not final. Id.
72. 1d. at 601, 239 S.E.2d at 422. In most states the central educational board meets
openly, either by a statute expressly requiring it to do so or because such boards are
functionally governing bodies. See Simon, supra note 14, at 94; TYPEs, supra note 46, at 13-18.
Contra Associated Students of U. of Colo. v. Regents of U. of Colo., 189 Colo. 482, 543 P.2d
59 (1975); VA. CoDE tit. 2.1, § 1-3'14(7) (Supp. 1980).
73. 293 N.C. at 602, .239 S.E.2d at 423. The dissent believed that the law should be
liberally construed since the state universities belong to the people of North Carolina, and
thus their business is the public's business. Id. The majority, however, never discussed the
policy of the open meeting statute and was instead more concerned with the result if it
were applied. id. at 597, 239 S.E.2d at 418. The majority discussed consequences to athletic
competition if coaching staffs were required to meet openly. The court further noted that
open faculty meetings might invite "other members of the public seeking only a warm
shelter on a cold winter's day." Id.
74. Id. at 606, 239 S.E.2d at 426. The dissent noted the record on appeal was limited to
the complaint because the law faculty failed to answer at trial. Id. at 602, 239 S.E.2d at 423.
See generally Comment, 8 Cum. L. REv. 539 (1977) (discussing the lower appellate court's
holding that the open meeting statute does apply to the law faculty).
75. 293 N.C. at 596, 239 S.E.2d at 419. The majority inconsistently refers to the law
faculty as both a component part and as mere employees. However, the issue of delegation of authority is moot in Byrd as the Board of Governors need not meet openly.
76. Id. at 604, 239 S.E.2d at 425.
77. Cathcart v. Anderson, 85 Wash. 102, 530 P.2d 313 (1975).
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governing body.7
In Fain v. Faculty of College of Law,7 9 a Tennessee appellate court
similarly relied upon the university's statutory grant of authority 0 to hold
that neither the law faculty nor its committees were governing bodies. Noting
that state statutes delegated final authority to the law dean, not to the
faculty,8 ' the court found that the committees existed by the grace of the
dean and had no independent authority.8 2 The majority argued that since the
open meeting law was inapplicable to the dean, it was equally inapplicable to
committees the dean appointed.8 3 By relying upon the statute delegating
authority to the university,8 ' however, the court failed to consider the Tennessee open meeting statute's expansive language m
The Fain approach contrasts with that adopted in Byrd. Each court was
presented with a case of first impression and employed a different mode for
resolution of the issue presented. Construing the open meeting statute's
language in a restrictive sense, the court in Byrd exempted the state university
system from the law's provisions. In Fain, the court relied on the statute creating the university system to determine the applicability of the subsequently
enacted open meeting statute. The Fain court presumed that the open meeting
statute's scope was properly interpreted by deducing whether independence
and self-governance were statutorily granted to the institution 88 This approach
is flawed, however, because no consideration is given to the policies underlying
the open meeting statute.8 7
By contrast, in states where the universities are constitutionally created,
these thorny issues have met with easier resolution. Such constitutional provisions often accord universities autonomy and cloak them with protection
against state legislative intrusions.88 In Associated Students of the University of
78. Id. at 106, 530 P.2d at 315. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 42.30.030 (1972) (public agency
and governing body required for application).
79. 552 S.W.2d 752 (Tenn. App.), cert. denied, 552 S.W.2d 752 (1977).
80. Id. at 754.
81. Id. The court was impressed that former deans of the College of Law rarely met
with faculty or committees to solicit help with decisions. See also Bennett v. Warden, 333
So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1976); TYPEs, supra note 46, at 47-48.
82. 552 S.W.2d at 756. Appellant argued the faculty is a governing body because the
Association of American Law Schools requires law faculty to have primary responsibility for
determining institutional policy. Id. Distinguishing primary authority from final authority,
the court rejected this argument. Id.
83. Id. at 754.
84. Cf. Wickhorn, supranote 57, at 560-62.
85. TENN. CODE ANN. 8-44-101 (Supp. 1980). The Fain court distinguished Dorner v.
Dark, 537 S.W.2d 888 (1976), in which the Tennessee Supreme Court defined governing body
to include those entities with authority only to recommend, id. at 891, and found this expansive interpretation necessary to implement the policy of the act. 552 S.W .d at 755.
86. See Simon, supra note 14, at 92. Some open meeting statutes specifically require
examination of the entity's mode of creation to determine the law's applicability. E.g., IDAHO
CODE § 67-2341(3) (Supp. 1976).
87. This may be the proper means to balance the conflicting statutes, however, the
opinions do not discuss "balancing." Further, the judiciary may be the improper forum for
balancing important public policy conflicts.
88. See Beckham, Reasonable Independence for Public Higher Education: Legal Implica.
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Colorado v. Regents of the University of Colorado,89 the state constitution
granted the Board of Regents sufficient authority to meet in closed sessions,
despite the requirements of an open meeting statute. 90 The state supreme
court held that a Regents.' rule was not implicitly repealed by the open
meeting statute's requirement of public access to any meeting discussing
public business.0 1 Since the Regents' powers derived from the constitution,
and the open meeting statute failed to bring the Regents expressly within its
2
ambit, the open meeting statute was held inapplicable to Regents' meetings.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court reached a different conclusion when faced
with a similar issue. Although the Oklahoma Board of Regents was created
constitutionally, 93 the state supreme court held that the state university medical
college admissions board must meet openly. 94 The state's open meeting statute
differed in one significant way from the Colorado statute: it expressly included
boards of public and higher education within its ambit.9 5 The court noted that
constitutional authority neither granted autonomy nor exempted universities
from state statutes.96 As these divergent results indicate, the failure of state
legislatures to apply their open meeting statutes specifically to higher education may result in inconsistent judicial resolution of the problem.97
Where open meeting laws are found applicable to the state university system,
it next becomes necessary to determine which meetings must be open. In
Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Pickens,9s the Arkansas Supreme Court subjected the
Committee for Student Affairs, which was appointed by the State Board of
Trustees, to the open meeting requirement.9 9 The Arkansas open meeting

tions of Constitutionally Autonomous Status, 7 J.L. & EDuc. 177 (1978). Thirty-five states
assure institutional independence and substantial university self-governance, through constitutional authority. However, only four states construe this grant as absolute independence or
autonomy. Id. at 179.
89. 189 Colo. 482, 543 P.2d 59 (1975).
90. COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 12, art. VIII, § 5(2) (1972 Amend.). University faculty and
students sought an injunction to prevent the Regents from meeting secretly. The court
balanced the constitutional authority of the Regents rule with the open meeting statute and
allowed closed sessions. 189 Colo. at 484, 543 P.2d at 62.
91. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 24-6-402 (1979) provides: "all meetings of any board ... or policy
making authority . . . at which public business is discussed . , . are to be open . . . except

as provided in the Constitution." Cf. Tallahassee Democrat v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 314 So.
2d 164 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1975).
92. 189 Colo. at 484, 543 P.2d at 62. The Colorado Legislature responded to Associated
Students by passing a statute expressly including state organs of higher education within the
open meeting law's purview. CoLo. Ray. STAT. § 29-9-101(3) (1977).
93. OKLA. CONs5r. art. XIII, § 8.
94. Carl v. Board of Regents, 557 P.2d 912 (Okla. 1978).
95. OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 304(1) (West Supp. 1980).
96. 557 P.2d at 914. The court found the Board of Regents to be a governing body
and the medical school admissions board a component thereof. Id. at 916. See Kraft, supra
note 47, at 54 (admissions committees are tertiary layers of delegated authority).
97. Since open meeting statutes require the citizens to bring suit to enforce the law,
rarely are the statutes enforced against the universities. See infra note 126.
98. 258 Ark. 69, 522 S.W.2d 350- (1975).
99. The Committee for Student Affairs is essentially a subcommittee of the Board of
Trustees as it consists of five persons of the ten person Board. Id. at 70, 522 S.W.2d at 350.
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statute did not address whether such subcommittees must meet openly.100 The
court noted, however, that since the parent body, the Board of Trustees, is
required to meet openly, it would be incongruous to allow a subordinate
committee to meet secretly. 10' The open meeting requirement has been similarly
enforced in other states102 when the sub-entity consists either wholly or in
part 10 3 of the same persons as the central governing board. State courts have
found that the open meeting policy'0 4 would be thwarted if the delegation of
authority to sub-groups prevented public access. 0 5 Indeed, a logical extension
of the Pickens holding 06 could apply the open meeting statute to other entities to which a state governing board has delegated its authority. 07 Further, it
could possibly include all university entities ultimately answerable to the
central board. 08
Such an extension of Pickens would be problematic because courts have
drawn a distinction between committees with final authority and those with
only the power to recommend. In McLarty v. Board of Regents of University
System of Georgia,0 9 the state supreme court held the open meeting law inapplicable to the Student Activities Fund Committee because the Committee
only recommended action." 0 The Committee reviewed student senate allocations of student services monies and made recommendations to the university
president."' The Georgia court construed the statutory standard "official
actions" to exclude fact-finding and advisory groups that only recommend
action." 2 This narrow construction, requiring final authority, limits the
3
effective reach of sunshine laws by excluding advisory boards.,
100. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2803 (1968) ("Public meetings are the meetings of . . .
governing bodies ...Boards of Education ...and all other organizations supported wholly
or in part by public funds."). The court attached no significance to the semantic difference

between governing body and the committee at bar, holding instead the legislative intent to
"cover the field." 258 Ark. at 70, 522 S.W.2d at 350.
101. 258 Ark. at 83, 552 S.W.2d at 254. The court cited favorably Bigelow v. Howze, 291
So. 2d.645 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974), and followed Florida's expansive view to include subcommittees of the whole. The Arkansas court adopted the Florida Supreme Court's statement
in Board of Pub. Instr. v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969) ("Statutes enacted for the
public benefit should be construed most favorably to the public."). Id. at 699.
102. Similarly in Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co. v. University of Louisville Bd.of
Trustees, 596 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. App. 1979), the court held the University Foundation, a private

corporation organized to administer the university's assets, subject to the open meeting law.
103. In Pickens, the committee consisted of the Board of Trustees themselves. 258 Ark.
at 82, 522 S.W.2d at 253.
104. Id. at 377.
105.

See Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So,2d 473 (Fla. 1974).

106. 258 Ark. at 72, 522 S.W.2d at 353.
107.

See Gellhor &Boyer, supra note 24, at 585; Kraft, supra note 47, at 55.

108. The subdelegation of authority within the university system is often complex and
final authority is rarely delineated. See Smith, supra note 22, at 73-74.
109. 231 Ga. 22, 200 S.E.2d 117 (1973).

110. 231 Ga. at 23, 200 S.E.2d at 118.
111. Id.
112. Id. See GA. CODE § 40-3301(a) (1979) ("all meetings of any . . . commission or subdivision . .. board of education ... at which official actions are taken.. .
See generally
Note, The People's Right to Know in Georgia, 10 GA. ST. B.J. 598 (1974).
113. Tyz's, supra note 46, at 33-46.
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Open meeting statutes are motivated by a desire to ensure public accountability. 114 However, the existing statutory tests are an inadequate means
for achieving this end.115 The decisive phrases "governing body" and "official
6
action" should be construed to promote the policy of open governance."
Judicial reliance solely on the method used to create the state university system
in interpreting sunshine laws may thwart their legislative intent. As the above
cases indicate, neither the legislative policy in the open meeting statute, nor
the state's policy toward independence of its universities, has been consistently
dispositive in determining the applicability of open meeting statutes to higher
education.
INTERPRETING FLORIDA'S SUNSHINE LAW

Florida's Sunshine Law '7 is one of the nation's most expansive open
meeting statutes,"" encompassing "all meetings of any board or commission of
a state agency" wherein official actions are taken. 1 9 Strong legislative intent'20
is manifested by the Sunshine Law's mandate that all meetings of state entities
are open unless otherwise provided in the constitution.12' Courts applying the
Sunshine Law must determine if the entity meeting is a board or commission
of a state agency"2 2 capable of taking official action. 23 Although recent case
114. See supra note 11.
115. The Student Activities Funds Committee might have been subject to the open
meeting statute had Georgia's law used a "public funds test." See supra notes 64 & 65 and
accompanying text.
116. See Board of Pub. Instr. of Broward County v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693, 699 (Fla. 1969).
117. FLA. STAT. § 286.011 (1981).
118. Accord Hollow S. Ennis, supra note 10, at 536-43; Wickham, supra note 12, at 491
(Florida's attempt at "Total Sunshine"); Note, New York Open Meetings Law; A Critical
Evaluation, 41 ALBANY L. REV. 329, 331 (1971) (Florida is the nation's model). Florida has
led the nation in implementing the open meeting policy of public accountability. The
national impact of Florida's expansive case law is readily apparent by the frequency with
which Florida cases are cited to support expanding the coverage of open meeting statutes.
E.g., Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Pickens, 258 Ark. 69, 74-75, 522 S.W.2d 350, 354-55 (1975); Greene
v. Athletic Council of Iowa State Univ., 251 N.W.2d 559, 560 (Iowa 1977); Carl v. Board of
,Regents of Univ. of Okla., 577 P.2d 912, 914 (Okla. 1978); Student Bar Ass'n Bd. of
Governors v. Byrd, 293 N.C. 594, 614, 239 S.E.2d 415, 426 (1977); Cathcart v. Anderson, 85
Wash.2d 102, 108, 530 P.2d 317, 325 (1975); Enterprise Co. v, City of Beaumont, 574 S.W.2d
786, 788 (Tex. App. 1978). Contra State ex rel. Lynch v. Conta, 239 N.W.2d 313, 326, 331 (1976)
(Wisconsin rejects Florida's literal reading of voidability).
119. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (1981).
120. The newly reapportioned 1967 Florida Legislature unanimously enacted the SunshineLaw. FLA. S. JOUR. 1086 (Reg. Sess. 1967) (enacted: 48 to 0); FLA. H.R. JouR. 1532 (Reg. Sess.
1967) (enacted: 98 to 0).
121. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (1981).
122, See City of Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So. 2d 38, 40 (Fla. 1971) (application of the
Sunshine Law depends upon whether the entity meeting is under the "dominion and
control" of the legislature). See also OFFICE OF THE ATrORNEY GENERAL, FLORIDA OPEN
GOVERNMENT LAW MANUAL 4 (1978); Op. Att'y. Gen. Fla. 073-348 (1973).
123. The phrase "official action" has lead to much of the litigation. See Walling v.
Carlton, 109 Fla. 97, 147 So. 236 (1933) ("Any act done by the officer in his official capacity
under and by virtue of his office."). See also Greenberg, An Annotated History of Florida's
Su- ishine Law, reprinted in 118 CONG. REc. 26,908 (1972).
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may help to clarify the confusion created by the statute's broad
language, 125 very few Florida courts have ruled specifically 28 on the Sunshine
12 7
Law's applicability to the university system.
Florida's state university system was created by the Post Secondary Education Act.'12 The Board of Education,129 authorized in the state constitution, 30
supervises all levels of education in the state. The Board of Regents governs
the state university system subject only to Board of Education veto,' 3' and has
broad statutory authority to elect a chancellor, appoint university presidents,
and promulgate rules governing the universities. 32 The legislature intended
the Board of Regents to have primary authority for university policy decisions. 33 The statutory delegation of administrative duties and powers flows
to the universities through the university president, who is the chief administrative officer responsible for the rules and policies within the university. 34
The Board of Regents meets openly and is recognized as a state agency
for Sunshine Law purposes. 35 The universities were created by statute and
should be considered state agencies. 38 Determining whether individual officers
may be considered "agencies," however, is crucial in analyzing whether comlaw124

124. Wood v. Marston, No. 80-825 (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct. July 24, 1981), docketed AF-475 (Fla.
1st D.C.A. Aug. 1981); Szymanski v. University of Fla., No. 91-2283CA, docketed, (Fla. 8th
Cir. Ct. Oct. 1981).
125. Simon, supra note 14, at 85. A survey of university and college presidents in Florida
revealed their lack of understanding of the Sunshine Law's impact on higher education. The
administrators seemed most unsure about the Sunshine Law and advisory bodies. In Florida,
advisory boards are usually included in the open meeting requirement; however, 39 percent
of the administrators thought they would never be required to meet openly. Id.
126. Marston v. Gainesville Sun Publishing Co., 341 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1st D.CA. 1976),
cert. denied, 352 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1977); Bennett v. Warden, 33 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.
1976); Wood v. Marston, No. 80-825 (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct. July 24, 1981), docketed AF-475 (Fla.
1st D.C.A. Aug. 1981). See also Chung-Ling Yu v. Criser, 880 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.
1976); Tallahassee Democrat v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 814 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1975).
127. See generally TYPEs, supra note 46; Shurtz, supra note 52; Note, supra note 10.
128.

FLA. STAT. Ch. 240 (1981).

129. FrA. STAT. § 229.012-.053 (1981). The Board of Education is composed of the
Governor and his cabinet.
130. FLA. CONsr. art. IX, § 2.
181. FLA. STAT. § 240.203 (1981). See also Tallahassee Democrat v. Florida Bd. of Regents,
814 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1975) (a Regents rule not vetoed by the Board of Education
within 90 days is law). The Board of Education has no authority to overrule the Regents;
its authority is only to supervise, approve and review. Id. at 166.
182. FLA. STAT. § 240.209-.225 (1981).
188. See FLA. STAT. § .240.209(1) (1981).
184. FLA. STAT. § 240.227(1) (1981). See also Note, supra note 27, at 122-27 (the delegation
of administrative powers from central governing boards).
135. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE 66-1.05 (1980) (Regents Rule that all Board of Regents meetings are open). But see FLA. STAT. § 240.209(3)(a) (1981) (Board of Regents search committee
exempt from the Sunshine Law and the Public Records Law when meeting to chose nominees
for university presidents. Inferentially, the Board of Regents' other meetings are open). See also
The Independent Florida Alligator; Nov. 12, 1981, at 17 (Regents violated Sunshine Law by
selecting university president in closed session).
136. FrA. STAT. § 240.2011 (1981). See Leiberman v. Marshall, 236 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1970).
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mittees deriving authority from the university president 137 are boards or commissions of a state agency.13 8 Arguably, a state university president can be
considered an agency subject to the Sunshine Law. The Public Records Act,
which provides for public access to governmental records, works in tandem
with the Sunshine Law 1

9

and defines agency to include "any public or private

person ... acting on behalf of any public agency."' 40 Similarly, the Government Reorganization Act defines agency as encompassing individual officers.' 4 1
As yet, the president of a state university or college has not been judicially
recognized as an agency within the Sunshine Law, although other individuals
42
have been so labelled.
In Bennett v. Warden,'4 3 the Second District Court of Appeal held that
the president of a junior college was an executive officer outside the scope
of the Sunshine Law.144 Bennett involved a committee appointed by the
college president, the Career Employment Council (CEC), which made
suggestions and recommendations to the president. 45 No express rule or statute
created the CEC. Rather, the president, by his general authority, established
the CEC to aid his decision-making.14 The Bennett court excluded the CEC
from the Sunshine Law because its authority was delegated from the president, who by definition is not a board or commission of a state agency. 47 The
court further classified the CEC's actions as mere fact-finding, not official
actions,14 s and therefore too remote from the actual decision-making to warrant
application of the Sunshine Law. 49 The Bennett court excluded the CEC
137. University president is used demonstratively and is intended to include all administrative officers in the state's universities and junior colleges.
138. See Simon, supra note 14, at 101-02. See also Fain v. Faculty of College of Law, 552
S.W.2d 752 (Tenn. App. 1977); supra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
139, FLA. STAT. § 119.011 (1979). See OFFincE OF THE AT-ORNEY GENERAL, supra note 66.
140. FLA. STAT. § 119.011(2) (1981).
141. FLA. STAT. § 20.03(1) (1981) (agency is "an official, officer, commission, authority,
committee, department, division, bureau, board, section or another unit or entity of government."). See also FLA. STAT. § 120.52(3) (1981) (agency head); Krause v. Reno, 366 So. 2d 1244,
1252 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1979).
142. Cf. Marston v. Gainesville Sun Publishing Co., 341 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1976)
(reversing on other grounds the circuit court's finding that the president of the University
of Florida is an agency and leaving the question expressly reserved).
143. 333 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1976).
144. Id. at 99. The state community college system is created in Part III of the Post
Secondary Education Act. It substantially parallels the state university system. However, each
community college has its own Board of Trustees (similar to the Board of Regents) that is
in turn answerable to the State Board of Education. The community college president is
corporate secretary of the Board of Trustees and chief executive officer of the college. FLA.
STAT. §§ 240.301-.379 (1981).
145. 333 So. 2d at 100.
146. Id. at 98. The CEC was designated by the president to discuss and make suggestions
relating to working conditions, hours, and wages. Id.
147. Id. at 99.
148. Id. at 100. But see Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1969), in which the same appellate court defined official acts to include: "passive nonformal acts such as: the act of deliberating; the act of deciding; the act of listening to reports
or expert advice ... " Id. at 473.
149. 333 So. 2d at 100. The president's recommendations gleaned through discussion
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from the Sunshine Law prerequisites of "agencies capable of official actions."' 150
In Wood v. Marston,351 law students sought access to planned closed meetings of the Search and Screen Committee organized to aid in the selection of
a new dean at the University of Florida College of Law. 152 The circuit judge,
in permanently enjoining the dosed sessions, conclusorily stated that the
Committee "under a charge from the university president . . . is a board or
commission of a state agency which holds meetings at which official acts are
taken."' 5 3 Unlike the CEC in Bennett, the Search and Screen Committee is
granted authority by the university's constitution,15 4 and the university is
statutorily granted the power to appoint deans. 55 However, this delegation of
authority does not foreclose the need to determine the advisory board's capacity
for official actions and whether the president may be properly considered an
agency.
The Search and Screen Committee in Wood was selected by the law
faculty.' ; The committee's charge was to recommend dean candidates to the
law faculty. 57 In turn, the faculty was to recommend its selection of candidates
for dean to the university president. 58 The committee, like the CEC in Bennett,
was an advisory body operating through the faculty to the president. The
committee's duty to search and screen applicants could arguably be considered
with the CEC were made to an Administrative Council, which meets publicly. The Council
then made recommendations to the Board of Trustees who took final action. Id. Recommendations alone, however, are official actions under Florida's foreseeable official action
standard. See infra notes 177-88 and accompanying text; Note, Exceptions to the Sunshine
Law and the Public Records Law: Have They Impaired Open Government in Florida?, 8
FLA. ST. U.L Rxv. 265, 275-77 (1980).
150. See Simon, supra note 14, at 100-01 (discussing the anomaly that the administrative
officer in Bennett was not subject to the Sunshine Law but dicta to the effect that less remote
meetings than the CEC might be open).
151. No. 80-825 (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct. July 24, 1981), docketed AF-475 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. Aug.
1981). See also Inf. Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. to Senator Jack Gordon (Oct. 14, 1974) (the Search
and Screen Committee must meet openly); Orr'cE oF Tm AiToS,NEY GENViAL supra note 122,
at 7.
152. The committee never met secretly since a temporary restraining order was issued.
No. 80-825 at 2 (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct. April 2, 1980), aff'd mem., 394 So. 2d 1,157 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.
1981); however the final order is still pending, docketed AF-475 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. Aug. 1980).
153. No. 80-825 at 7. The circuit court failed to trace the delegation of authority to
the committee established in the stipulations. The court broadly held that the rights of access
outweighed any need for secrecy. Wickham suggests that the public interest in access to
decisions about prospective personnel is not critical. Wickham, supra note 12, at 485. Further,
it is unrealistic to ignore the chilling effect open meetings have upon discussion of the candidates. Id.
154. Univ. of Fla. Const. ch. 4, § 20(A)(3) (1979). University constitutions are adopted by
the Board of Regents pursuant to its rulemaking authority. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 66-3.03 (1980).
155. FLA. STAT. § 240.227(5) (1981). The importance of statutory authority is demonstrated
in Pope v. Parkinson, 48 111. App. 3d 797, 363 N.E.2d 438 (II1. App. Ct. 1977) (university
advisory boards need not meet openly unless created by statute).
156. No. 80-825 at 2.
157. Id.
158. 'Id. The faculty rejected the committee's first five suggestions for dean and the
search was resumed. A second suggestion of five applicants was made in January 1981. The
faculty approved four and added a fifth before submitting this list to the university president, Id. at 3.
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fact-finding, as the CEC's duties were classified in Bennett.159 The judge, however, took judicial notice that the university president has always followed the
Search and Screen Committee's recommendation in making his decision. 160
Discarding the remoteness rationale of Bennett, the circuit judge in Wood
felt that the de facto decision-making of the committee should be determinative of its capacity for official actions.' 1 , Thus, one of the two statutory tests
was met.
The circuit judge must have assumed the committee was part of a state
agency, because he failed tc examine the issue. The committee in Wood was
an advisory board to the president, yet the court failed to consider whether
a university president met the definition of a state agency. The judge relied
on the Sunshine Law's openness policy and de-emphasized the technical tests
of applicability.1 2 Despite the defendants' contention that public access would
chill the application and selection process, 163 the circuit judge followed the
statutory mandate of openness.
The judiciary can do little to combat university resistance to the Sunshine
Law. However, a case-by-case approach adopting Wood's strong presumption
of openness, may deter universities from holding secret meetings.'" because
Wood is pending in the First District Court of Appeal, 165 the applicability of
the Sunshine Law in higher education remains uncertain.
The Sunshine Law's Applicability Outside
the HigherEducation Context
Because few cases have applied the open meeting requirement to higher
education, guidance must come from other case law interpreting the Sunshine
Law's provisions. The litigation can be divided into two areas. The first involves
school boards, 6 and state, 6 7 county1 68 and municipal 19 boards or commissions.
159. See supra note 149.
160. No. 80-825 at 2.
161. Id. Accord IDS Properties Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach, 279 So. 2d 353, 356 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1973).
162. No. 80-825 at 6-7 ("The legislature intended that sunshine fall upon the high
and the low, the rich and the poor, the learned and the unschooled. . .).
163. Id. at 5-6. See also Wolfson v. State, 344 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1977).
164. Contra Szymanski v. University of Fla., docketed, No. 81-2283 (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct.
Oct. 1981). Six weeks after the Wood order another Search and Screen Committee was
formed to replace the Dean of Student Services. This committee meet secretly, since the
university contended that the Wood order was narrow and applied only to the law dean
search. After a new dean was selected, students brought suit to void the appointment and
impose misdemeanor charges against the University of Florida president as authorized in
FLA. STAT. § 286.011(l)(3) (1981). In response to this suit, the university president reconvened the search committee for the Dean of Student Services in order to conduct the proceedings openly. See The Independent Florida Alligator, Oct. 7, 1981, at 4 (Official Statement
of President Marston).
165. Wood, No. 80-825 (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct. July 24, 1981) docketed AF-475 (Fla. 1st D.C.A.
Aug. 1981).
166. E.g., Tribune Co. v. School Bd. of Hillsborough County, 367 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1979);
Canney v. Board of Pub. Instr. of Alachua County, 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973); Board of
Pub. Instr. of Broward County v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969); Blackford v. School Bd.
of Orange County, 375 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1979); Tolar v. School Bd. of Liberty
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These entities have generally been required to meet openly. The second group
of cases involves the committees and sub-groups of these parent entities.
Whether the Sunshine Law applies to these
committees and sub-groups depends
70
upon their capacity for official actions.
When confronted with entities clearly within the Sunshine Law's ambit,
the judiciary has given an expansive interpretation to the statute. In Times
PublishingCo. v. Williams,1' 1 the Second District Court of Appeal held that

the Sunshine Law required all meetings of the school board to be open to the
public. 7 2 Formerly, the Florida courts subjected only formal meetings to the
open meeting laws, while informal sessions could be conducted secretly 73 The
Williams court rejected the distinction between formal and informal meetings 74 and mandated access to the entire decision-making process. 7 5 The court
interpreted "official actions" to include discussion, fact-finding and delibera1 78
tion.
In Board of Public Instruction v. Doran, 77 the Supreme Court of Florida
adopted and extended the Williams rationale by holding the Sunshine Law
applicable to all meetings from which "foreseeable official action" might
County, 863 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978); Mitchell v. School Bd. of Leon County, 335
So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1976); Times Publishing Co. v. Williams, 222 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2d
D.C.A. 1969).
167. E.g., Occidental Chemical Co. v. Mayo, 351 So. 2d 336 (Fla. 1977); Turner v.
Wainwright, 379 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1980); Florida Parole & Probation Comm'n v.
Thomas, 364 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1st D.CA. 1978); State Dep't of Pollution Control v. State
Career Serv. Comm'n, 320 So. 2d 846 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1975).
168. E.g., Bigelow v. Howze, 291 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974); Shaughnessy v. Metropolitan Dade County, 288 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1970).
169. E.g., Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974); City of Miami
Beach v. Berns, 245 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971); Jones v. Tanzler, 238 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 1970);
Kellearn Properties, Inc. v. City of Tallahassee, 366 So. 2d 172 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1979); Wolfson
v. State, 344 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1977); IDS Properties, Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach,
279 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1974); Hough v. Stembridge, 278 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.

1978).
170. Most Florida litigation centers on the ambiguous term, "official actions." As one
commentator stated: "In other words, public meetings are meetings at which official acts
can be taken, and official acts can only be taken at so called 'public meetings.' Or, as an
early English dictionary once explained, a cello is a large violin, and a violin is a small
cello." Simon, supra note 14, at 90.
171. 222 So. 2d 470, 474 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1969). See Note, supra note 10, at 365.
172. 222 So. 2d at 474.
173. The Florida Supreme Court had held that the open meeting statute applied
only to formal meetings. Turk v. Richard, 47 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1980). See Note, supra note
10, at 364.
174. 222 So. 2d at 473-74.
175. Id. See Note, Government in the Sunshine: Judicial Application and Suggestions
for Reform, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. Rnv. 537, 538 (1974).
176. 222 So. 2d at 473-74. The restrictive view of official actions in Bennett v. Warden
is an anachronism in light of the Second District Court of Appeal's holding in Times, which

may suggest a judicial policy determination that the Sunshine Law should not apply to
higher education. See Wolfson v. State, 344 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1977); Bigelow v.
Howze, 291 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974).
177. 224 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1969).
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result."7s The school board in Doran had repeatedly met in closed sessions on
the Wednesday before their Thursday public meetings. 1'7 9 Doran's expansive
approach has been followed in subsequent cases.180
In the second area of Sunshine Law cases, foreseeable official action has
been extended to include advisory boards appointed to recommend action. In
IDS Properties Inc. v. Town of Palm Beach,'8' the Fourth District Court of
Appeal held Palm Beach's Citizens Planning Committee subject to the open
meeting requirement.' 8 2 The Committee was appointed by the Town Council
to advise a planning firm that was developing the town's comprehensive zoning
plan.' 8 3 While the plan was ultimately adopted at an open Town Council
meeting, it was initially developed in closed meetings between the planners
and the Committee. 8 4 Forbidding such action, the court noted that the
Sunshine Law could not be circumvented through government by delegation.'8 5
The court recognized the de facto delegation of authority and held the
Planning Committee to be the alter ego of the Town Council.8 6 Affirming
this decision in Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison,as7 the Florida Supreme
Court acknowledged that any committee of the Town Council acting in any
advisory capacity must meet openly.'88
IDS and Gradison indicate expansive construction of the Sunshine Law
in two important areas. IDS, like Wood, viewed de facto delegation of authority
as the controlling factor. 9 Gradison and subsequent cases have recognized
that the capacity to recommend can be equivalent to official action.'19 However, these cases involved advisory committees to a parent entity which was
clearly subject to the Sunshine Law. Although universities are agencies and
hence subject to the Sunshine Law, it is unclear whether the law applies to
university presidents or deans. Therefore, the Sunshine Law status of advisory bodies to university administrators is even more unclear.lD1
Sensitive to the administrative problems that would result if the president
178. Id. at 698. This standard has allowed Florida to lead the nation in "total sunshine."
See Project, supra note 10, at 1193-99.
179. 224 So. 2d at 699. See also Blackford v. School Bd. of Orange County, 375 So. 2d 578
(Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1979).
180. See Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473, 474 (Fla. 1974); City of
Miami Beach v. Berns, 245 So. 2d 38, 39-40 (Fla. 1971).
181. 279 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1973), aff'd sub nom., Town of Palm Beach v.
Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974).
182. Id. at 359.
183. Id. at 355.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 356.
186. Id. Accord Bigelow v. Howze, 191 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974) (judicial notice
that advisory committee recommendations are often accepted by the parent entity at face
value).
187. Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1974).
188. Id. at 476. Both cases, however, contained strong dissents arguing that the statute
does not clearly include such advisory bodies, and that such inclusion would have to come
from the legislature. IDS, 296 So. 2d at 478-82; Gradison, 279 So. 2d at 359-60.
189. See supra notes 160-61, 186 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 176 & 186.
191. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
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and all his informal discussions were subject to the Sunshine Law,1 92 the
Bennett court held that a college president is not a state agency. It rejected
93
the argument that the president acts as the alter ego of the Board of Trustees.'
Similar concerns were present in Krause v. Ren 0 94 In Krause, the Third
District Court of Appeal reached an effective compromise between the
public's need to be informed, and the need for administrative officers to
function efficiently. The Krause court stated that an ad hoc citizen's advisory
board appointed by the city manager to aid in the selection of a new police
chief was subject to the open meeting requirement.' 95 The capacity to
recommend was held to constitute official action, and the court rejected
Bennett's remoteness rationale. 98 Further, the Krause court determined that
the city manager, in opting to use an advisory board, placed himself within
97
the Sunshine Law's definition of agency "for these limited purposes."'
The Krause rationale may be effectively applied to the university setting. It
allows administrative officers to carry out daily tasks without unnecessary intrusions and publicity. However, when the officer appoints committees either
to recommend or to act with final authority, the public must have access. The
attorney general of Florida has issued an analogous opinion regarding executive officers.""8 The attorney general advised that when the governor is meeting
in a purely executive capacity he is not subject to the Sunshine Law's provisions' 99 However, the governor's executive status does not exempt such
meetings as the State Board of Education from the Sunshine Law.20 0 Although
by statute the governor is an agency, 20 ' the dual attributes of his office necessitate such a compromise. Similarly, when a university dean or president is using
advisory boards to aid him in university governance, the committees should
202
meet openly.
Krause avoided the semantic quagmire that an advisory board's capacity
for official actions poses, by recognizing that fact-finding and deliberation
constitute official action, despite the lack of final authority. 203 However, judicial
192.
193.
194.
195.

333 So. 2d at 99-100.
Id.
366 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1979):
Id. at 1250-51. See Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 075-59 (1975) (city manager is not subject

to the Sunshine Law).
195. 366 So. 2d at 1247. The court distinguished Krause from Gradison because the ad

hoc citizen's committee in Krause had no relationship to the city. Id. The city manager had
complete discretion in appointing citizens to the committee. The committee was therefore

a committee to an executive officer as the committees in Wood and Bennett had been. Id.
197. Id. at 1252. The court buttressed its position by examining the statutory definitions
of agency. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
198. Inf. Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. to Mr. William Muntzey (Jan. 17, 1973).
199. Id. See also Omrcn OF THE ArroNEY GENERAL, supra note 122, at 8.
200. Id. The Board of Education is essentially the governor's cabinet. See supra note 129.
201 FLA. STAT. § 120.52(1)(a) (1981) ("(1) Agency means: (a) The Governor in the

exercise of all executive powers other than those derived from the Constitution."). Broadly
construed this would be contrary to the attorney general's opinion, which requires the
governor to meet publicly only if acting on legislative mission.
202. Op..Att'y Gen. Fla. 074-267 (1974) (advisory committees to the university president
should meet openly). See OFnicE OF THE ArroRNEY GENERAL, supra note 122, at 7.

203. 366 So. 2d at 1248.
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recognition that performing in an advisory capacity constitutes official action
is alone insufficient; the parent body delegating advisory authority must still
satisfy the "agency" definition. Krause held the delegation of authority from
an administrative/executive officer of a state agency did not prevent application
of the Sunshine Law. Nevertheless, the statute's language still compelled the
court to label the city manager an "agency" for Sunshine Law purposes.204
Thus, the statute's definitional prerequisites have constrained the judicial
desire to implement its scope.
By according the Sunshine Law expansive construction, the judiciary has
sought to preserve the statute's openness policy against state agency circumvention.205 The Florida Supreme Court has referred to evasive actions as
"hanky panky," designed to deprive the public of its inalienable right to
attend government meeting. 206 When in doubt as to the application of the
Sunshine Law the court advises following the statute's policy and presumption
207
of openness.
CUTTING BACK ON THE SUNSHINE LAW

Despite the expansive interpretation of the Sunshine Law in Doran and
Gradison, the Supreme Court of Florida has carved out narrow exceptions
and factually excused violations of the open meeting requirement. 2 8 In Bassett
v. Braddock,2°9 the court refused to invalidate the secret election of the chairman and vice-chairman of the Dade County School Board. The majority held
that any violation was cured by the subsequent corrective "sunshine bright"
open vote.2 10 The supreme court disregarded its own earlier position that the
Sunshine Law prevents the secret crystallization of decisions to a point just
short of ceremonial acceptance.2 1. The court temporarily regressed to the
former distinction between formal and informal meetings in holding the Sunshine Law was satisfied "so long as ultimate debate and decisions are public"
and the "official acts and formal action" are taken in the open.2 1 2 Thus, although the school board was clearly subject to the Sunshine Law, the court
waivered in enforcing the requirement.
In Occidental Chemical Co. v. Mayo,21 3 the Florida Supreme Court created
the staff exception to the Sunshine Law in holding that the staff of the Public
Service Commission was not subject to the open meeting requirement. The
204. Id. at 1252. The imposition of the open meeting requirement should not have a
deterrent effect on the use of advisory boards as the reasons for their information are not
affected by the openness.

205. Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473, 477 (Fla. 1974).
206. Board of Pub. Instr. v. Doran, 224 So. 2d 693, 699 (Fla. 1969).
207. Town of Palm Beach v. Gradison, 296 So. 2d 473, 477 (Fla. 1974).
208. See generally Note, supra note 149.
209. 262 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1972).
210. Id. at 428. See Comment, Government in the Sunshine: Another Cloud on the
Horizon, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 603, 607 n.47 (1973).
211. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
212. 262 So. 2d at 427. See supra notes 120 & 185 and accompanying text.
213. 351 So. 2d 336, 341 (Fla. 1979).
214. Id.
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Commission had adopted a twenty-seven page document in a complex rate
case after only minimal public discussion.2 14 Nonetheless, the court rejected
Occidental's contention that either secret meetings of the Commission or de
215
facto delegation of authority to the Commission's staff must have occurred.
According to the ' ourt, -the mutual decision reached in a formal open vote
satisfied the Sunshine Law absent a showing that secret meetings or delegation
actually took place216
The conflict between the need for administrative efficiency and the policy
of open governance was clear in Occidental.217 The court found that the bureaucratic need to meet and work freely with staff outweighed the benefits of an
open meeting. 218 Aware that its decision conflicted with the foreseeable official
action standard, the court, in a footnote, paved the way for future re-evaluation
of the standard.' 9
Excluding staff meetings from the Sunshine Law's ambit departs from the
initial judicial reluctance to create exceptions. 220 The legislature has shown
no such reticence. Six statutory exceptions, 221 including one for collective
bargaining meetings enacted after the Florida Supreme Court recognized this as
a constitutional exception222 have been created.22 3 In light of these exceptions,
it would be foolhardy to read the statutes involved and conclude the Sunshine
Law applies unequivocally to higher education in Florida. More accurately,
the Sunshine Law creates a rebuttable presumption of openness in higher
education subject to judicial rejection when superior interests intersect.
SPECIAL POLICY CONSIDERATxIONS
IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Applying the Sunshine Law to higher education prompts conflicts among
the public's right of access, the university's need for independence from external
215. Id.
216. Id. at 342. See Comment, Court Will Not Find Violation of Law Where "An Appearance of Prejudgment" Exists But No Evidence of Secret Meetings Appears in the Record;
Members of a Public Body May Consult Their Staff in Private for Advice on Pending Issues,

6 F". ST. U.L. REv. 199, 208 (1978) ("A Catch 22 situation: the court requires proof of
the meetings, but the court will not look beyond the record to find the needed proof...
217.
218.

Occidental, 351 So. 2d at 341-42.
Id. Accord Mitchell v. School Bd. of Leon County, 335 So. 2d 854, 355 (Fla. 1st

.D.,CA.1976) ('That law was never intended to become a millstone around the necks of
public officials ..
219. 851 So. 2d at 342 n.10. See Comment, supra note 216, at 210.
220. Accord Note, supra note 149, at 294. See Canney v. Board of Pub. Instr. of Alachua
County, 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973); City of Miami Beach v. Berns, Q45 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1971);
Turner v. Wainwright, 379 So. 2d 148 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1980).

221. FLA. STAT. § 106.25(5)

(1981)

(Election Commission proceedings);

§ 112.324(1) (1981) (Commission on Ethics);

FLA.
FLA.
FLA.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.

FLA STAT.

FLA.

STAT.

§ 228.093(3)(c) (1981) (student records);

§ 240.209(3)(a) (1981) (Board of Regents when selecting university presidents);
§ 447.205(10) (1981) (deliberations of Public Employees Relations Commission);
§ 447.605(1) (1981) (public sector negotiations).

222. Bassett v. Braddock, 262 So. 2d 425, 428 (Fla. 1972).
223. FLA. STAT. § 447.605(1) (1981). Seventeen other states specifically except collective

bargaining from the open meeting requirement. Simon, supra note 14, at 143.
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controls,224 and the individual's privacy rights. Laws protecting the confidentiality 25 of certain individual educational records may rebut the Sunshine
Law's presumption of openness.
In Marston v. Gainesville Sun Publishing Co.,2 26 the First District Court
of Appeal held that a student's statutory right to confidentiality outweighs
the public's right of access to University of Florida Student Honor Court
disciplinary hearings. 22 7 While the Florida Supreme Court has not addressed
this issue, a balancing of the conflicting statutory policies should prevent the
public from attending meetings where confidential student records are discussed. 228
University staff and faculty do not have such a clearly defined right to
confidentiality. The Public Records Act opens personnel records

of state

employees to public inspection. 229 However, the Florida Legislature has provided university employees certain privacy rights. University presidents may
control the content and custody of evaluative information in "limited access
2 30
These files are analogous to confidential student records
employee files."
and are similarly clothed in confidentiality. No Florida court has ruled on the
conflict between the Sunshine Law and the limited access employee files; how-

ever, meetings discussing such files will probably be exempt from the open
'
Other conflicts with individual privacy interests exist in employee discipline
23 2
In the Wood and Krause cases, the public
and appointment situations.
meeting requirement.

24. See supra notes 27-42 and accompanying text.
225. 20 U.S.C. § 1232 (1976) (the so-called Buckley Amendment); FLA. STAT. § 228.093
(3)(c) (1981); 3 FLA. ADMIN. CODE 6C1-4.07 (1981). Access to these files is limited, thus
meetings in which they are discussed will be rare.
226. 341 So. 2d 783 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1976).
227. Id. at 784-85. See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 122, at 39.
228. However, if the meeting would otherwise be open, the spirit of the Sunshine Law
could be preserved by posting an agenda which would allow the public access to nonconfidential portions of the meeting and reserving time for executive session at the end. Most state
open meeting laws contain a provision requiring the posting of notice. The Sunshine Law does
not; however, early judicial construction supplied this. See Hough v. Stesnbridge, 278 So. 2d 288
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1973); Shaughnessy v. Metropolitan Dade County, 238 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1970). See also Cooper v. Arizona Western College Dist. Governing Bd., 125 Ariz.
463, 610 P.2d 465 (Ct. App. 1980) (action void due to improper notice, subsequent public
ratification affirmed).
229. FLA. STAT. Ch. 119 (1981). Accord Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid & Assocs.,
379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980); News Press Publishing Co. v. Wisher, 345 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 1977)
(per curiam). See Note Privacy of Information in Florida Public Employee Personnel Files,
27 U. FLA. L. REV. 481, 484 (1975). But see State ex rel. Tindel v. Sharp, 300 So. 2d 750 (Fla.
1st D.C.A. 1974), cert. denied, 310 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1975) (evaluative data and records accumulated by consultant over years not subject to disclosure).
230. FLi. STAT. § 240.253 (1981). The record is released only upon written authorization
(waiver) of the employee or court order.
231. See Marston v. Gainesville Sun Publishing Co., 341 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1976);
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 122, at 38-39; Tallahassee Democrat Inc. v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 314 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1975) (affirming the Board of
Regents rule concerning limited access files).
232. See Cope, To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, 6 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 673, 698 (1978).
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interest in the selection of a new law dean and police chief, respectively, was
held to outweigh the privacy interests of the applicants. 233 While personal
information about the applicants was discussed at these meetings, the information was not protected by statute and was voluntarily submitted by the
applicant.
In the debate surrounding the 1967 enactment of the Sunshine Law, the
legislature rejected amendments that would dose meetings discussing employment violations.- 4 Many open meetings statutes in the nation exempt personnel
matters such as hiring and firing.235 Florida has rejected this path. However, in
a 1969 special act, applicable only to Hillsborough County, the legislature
238
permitted teacher disciplinary hearings to be closed at the teacher's option.
In 1979, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed this provision's constitutionality
despite allegations that it improperly delegated legislative authority to the
teachers.- 7 Although this statutory exception indicates legislative sensitivity
to the interests in conflict, the legislature has not acted to extend this exception
beyond Hillsborough County or to teacher disciplinary matters in higher
education.
The conflict between personal privacy and the open meeting statute is
unresolved.2s Florida's new constitutional amendment protecting privacy 2 9
also provides that it "shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access
to public records and meetings as provided by law." 240 The privacy amendment
has not yet been used to rebut the Sunshine Law's presumption of openness;
however, the Florida Supreme Court has held 241 that disclosure of personal
information through the Public Records Law does not violate constitutional
privacy rights. 242 The privacy interests often involved in higher education may
be constitutionally insufficient to prevent the Sunshine Law's application.
233. Neither case asserted a constitutional or statutory privacy interest as the basis for
secrecy, probably because the content of the information discussed was insufficient to be

within the personal privacy protection. However, in Szymanski v. University of Fla., No.
81-8283CA (Fla. 8th Cir. Ct. 1981), one of the applicants for the dean position was a current
employee of the university. The statutory coritlict between the limited access files and the

Sunshine Law was not resolved as the employee waived or released her file. See supra notes
151-61, 194-97 and accompanying text.
234. FLA. S. JOUR. 679 (Reg. Sess. 1967). The House had considered amendments excluding

the purely administrative functions of the agencies and specifically including the Florida
Education Association. FLA. H.R. JouR. 958-59 (Reg. Sess. 1967).
235. Thirty states except "personnel matters." The exception if broadly construed would
also exclude discipline, hiring, and firing. Simon, supra note 14, at 143. See ExcapnoNs, supra

note 46, at 21-48.
236. 1969 Fla. Laws, ch. 69-1146, § 5.
237. Tribune Co. v. School Bd. of Hillsborough County, 367 So. 2d 627, 628 (Fla. 1979).

See Note, supra note 149, at 270-73.
238. See Cope, supra note 232, at 697.
239. FLA. CoNsr. art. I, § 23 (1980 Amend.). See Cope, A Quick Look at Florida's New
Right of Privacy, 60 FLA. B.J. 12, 13 (1981).
240. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 23 (1980 Amend.).
241. Shevin v. Byron, Harless, Schaffer, Reid &Assocs., 379 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 1980).
242. Id. at 638-39. In Shevin a private firm of consultant psychologists was hired to
select a new director-of the Jacksonville Electric Authority. This firm was acting on behalf of
a state agency and was thus subject to the Public Records Act. The Florida Supreme Court
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In adlition to balancing the public's right to attend meetings of governmental agencies with the conflicting individual rights of confidentiality and
privacy, the judiciary must consider the impact of open meetings upon
university self-governance. Institutional independence is defined in a state's
statutes or constitution and is distinct from academic freedom. 24 3 However,
the degree of autonomy a state grants its universities reflects its policy toward
academic freedom. 244 The fundamental aspects of academic freedom- the
ability to freely teach, study, and discuss-are first amendment rights protected primarily by individual legal action.2 45 University resistance to open
meeting statutes stems from concerns that the open meeting requirement
will reduce institutional independence and self-governance. The unarticulated
fear is that public attendance at university meetings will result in public
opinion pressure for changes and consequently possible legislative intrusion
into university self-governance.2 46 This fear goes to the very core of the Sunshine
Law's policy of public accountability, which recognizes the public's right to be
24 7
informed of the activity of state agencies.
The institutional independence accorded state universities today was unknown until recently. 24s Indeed, the atmosphere was politically charged, and
academic freedom suffered. In 1959, as a result of the political process, the
University of Florida underwent an inquisition at the hands of a committee
of the state legislature.249 This ignoble history of inquisitions in Florida
higher education underscores the need for independent universities.
required disclosure of papers containing evaluative information about the applicants'
personal traits, habits, aspirations and families. Id. at 634-35. See Byron, Harless, Schaffer,
Reid & Assocs. v. State, 360 So. 2d 83 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1978), rev'd on appeal, 379 So. 2d 633
(Fla. 1980).
243. See R. O'NEIL, CouRrs, GOVERNMENT AND HIGHER FDUCATION 6-9 (1972); Project,
supra note 38, at 1378.
244. Note, Academic Freedom: How Does Florida Stand?, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 564, 573-75
(1965).
245. The Florida judiciary recognizes and protects academic freedom. See Jones v. Board
of Control, 131 So. 2d 713, 715 (Fla. 1961). See supra notes 13-38.
246. Nowhere in the existing work on open meeting statutes and higher education is the
impact on academic freedom discussed. Presumably, however, legislative intrusion into
the substantive matters of teaching and study would turn the institutions into propaganda
instruments and stifle any real academic freedom. Accord R. MACIVER, supra note 29, at 11222. See Keyeshian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (anti-Communism pledge required of professors invalid).
247. The policy motivating the open meeting statutes is exemplified in California's Brown
Act as the right of the sovereign people to have knowledge to retain control over their
agencies. See supra note 11.
248. See Note, supra note 244, at 573-79.
249. One commentator noted the University:
[S]ubmitted to an outrageous inquisition . . . conducted by a committee of the state
legislature,.... which held hearings for seven months on or near campus, with the
aid of lawyers, police, detectives, and paid informers, the committee dragged in
hundreds of witnesses, mainly students, to testify against professors. Disclosures of
political heresies were disappointing, but sexual deviations made headlines.
Id. at 576 (quoting Woodward, The Unreported Crisis in Southern Colleges, Harpers Mag.,
Oct. 1962, at 82.
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The statutes implementing the constitutional authority for state education
grant the Board of Regents substantial autonomy in governing the universities. 250 However, institutional autonomy has not been recognized as a constitutional right 1 despite eloquent advocacy of such a right.2 5 2 Judicial abstention
in academic matters evidences the recognized need for such institutional
autonomy.253 As a constitutional doctrine, academic freedom will only limit
application of the sunshine laws if an individual's first or fourteenth amendment rights are jeopardized.254 Moreover, there is no evidence at present that

heightened public awareness of university practices achieved through open
meetings will result in state intrusions into university independence.
The issue of opening committee meetings responsible for granting faculty

tenure epitomizes the three conflicting interests.-s Academic freedom postulates
2 50
In Florida,
tenure as necessary to protect the scholar from external pressures.
tenure committees are statutorily authorized committees of a state agency,

and are arguably subject to the Sunshine Laws? Tenure decisions, however,

250. Educational Extension Act of 1963, FLA. STAT. ch. 240 (1963) (effective upon iratification by 1964 constitutional amendment giving Board of Regents a nine year term). See FLA.
STAT. § 240.207-.209 (1981) (the Board of Regents is given primary policy formulation
authority).
251. See Comment, supra note 33, at 1547. "The limited endorsement of institutional
autonomy" is tenuous and found in Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262-63 (1957). In Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978), the majority cited Frankfurter's concurrence. 438 U.S. at 312. See also Keyeshian
v. Board of Regents, 385 US. at 602-04.
252. See Comment, supra note 33, at 1549-50; Developments, Academic Freedom, supra
note 31, at 1148-50; Note, Academic Freedom and Federal Regulation of University Hiring,
92 HARv. L. Rv. 879, 885-89 (1979). Institutional and individual academic freedom are not
clearly distinct and in upholding an individual right the institutional right is also protected.
253. Comment, supra note 33, at 1549 n.73 (citing H. EDwAmIs & V. NoMiN, HIGHER
EDucxTio, AND THE LAw (1979)). See also Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 US. 78, 92
(1978); Stebbens v. Wearer, 537 F.2d 939, 943 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041
(1977); Duke v. North Texas State Univ., 469 F.2d 829, 838 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 932 (1973).
254. See In Re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981). Academic freedom that protects
the individual's constitutional rights is not implicated when professors act in an administrative role. Id. at 431. Hence, disclosure of tenure voting may be compelled. Id. at 432-33. See
also Comment, supra note 33, at 1549.
255. Judicial review of tenure decisions occurs frequently today in light of Supreme
Court cases affording nontenured faculty procedural due process. See Slochower v. Board
of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Wieman v. Updegraff, 844 US. 183 (1952). The decisions in
cases of this sort indicate that decisions made within the university faculty or administrative
structural procedures are reviewed in open court, which "undoubtedly has eroded the
autonomy of faculty and institutional administration." Schultz, Nontenured Faculty:
Current Legal and PracticalProblems in Connection with Nonrenewal of Such Appointments,
1 J.C. 9- U.L. 74 (1973). See generally LaNove, Tenure and Title VII, I J.C. & U.L. 206 (1974)
(the judiciary may intrude into tenure to alter the whole process); Palmer, Due Process
Termination of Untenured Teachers, 1 J.L. & EDUc. 469 (1972).
256. See 2 FLA. AD nN. CODE 6C-5.225 (1980) (the tenure preamble reads: "Institutions
of higher education are conducted for the common good. The common good depends upon
unfettered search for truth and its free exposition. Academic freedom and tenure exist in
order that society may have the benefit of honest judgment and independent criticism.").
257. FLA. STAT. § 240.245 (1981); 2 FLA. ADnmm. ConE 6C-5.225 (1980).
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are an academic function and as such, independence and autonomy are most
jealously guarded.25 In a tenure situation, the faculty member under consideration has privacy interests which might be violated if the meeting were
open to the public. 25 9 Nevertheless, the individual under consideration may

willingly waive any privacy objections in order to allow openness and facilitate
a fair and rational decision. 260 The applicability of the Sunshine Law to tenure
meetings has never been litigated in Florida.
Use of discovery rules to compel disclosure of tenure committee voting may
present the issue analogously. 261 Due process and equal protection rights the
tenure applicant asserts will often require disclosure of tenure committee
voting.2 2 While tenure committee members might rush to assert an evidentiary
privilege against disclosure of committee voting based on individual academic
freedom rights, defining the scope of such a privilege is difficult.263 This
difficulty may stem partially from judicial uncertainty as to the source of any
right to nondisclosure. 6 4 Thus, while the discovery issue seems an enticing
analogy, it is not very useful.
Legislative guidance would be helpful in this area. The legislative compromise for Hillsborough County that allows the teacher an option of closing
disciplinary hearings may be an alternative for tenure committees. 2 5 Such an

258. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 236 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 547-48 (3d Cir. 1980); McKilcop v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 386 F. Supp. 1270, 1276 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Development, Academic Freedom,
supra note 31, at 1084-104; Van Alstyne, supra note 37, at 870-73.
259. Administrative disciplinary hearings are arguably quasi-judicial functions. In Florida,
the First District Court of Appeal allowed a quasi-judicial exception for student discipline
hearings in Canney v. Board of Pub. Instr., 231 So. 2d 34 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1970). The Florida
Supreme Court overruled Canney and rejected this exception. 278 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 1973).
The First District Court of Appeal nonetheless revived the quasi-judicial exception in State
Dep't of Pollution Control v. State Career Serv. Comm'n, 320 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1975).
See Note, supra note 149, at 273-75.
260. Many advocates of open meetings believe it will decrease the inaccurate reporting,
false light and misrepresentation that may damage public officials. Indeed, if university
meetings are opened a new platform is created for faculty and students to exercise their
first amendment freedoms. Accord Gellhorn & Boyer, supra note 24, at 585.
261. See generally Comment, supra note 33.
262. See, e.g., Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980) (sex discrimination); Cooper v. Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (first amendment right to
expression was violated in impermissible firing). But see Keyes v. Lenoir Rhyne College, 552
F.2d 579 (4th Cir.) (access to confidential faculty files denied faculty plaintiff), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 904 (1977).
263. See Note, supra note 38, at 1564-67.
264. See In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981) (voting disclosure compelled); Gray
v. Board of Higher Educ., No. 79-Civ. 0062 (LWP) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1981) (limited confidentiality privilege, disclosure not required); McKellop v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 386 F.
Supp. 1270 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (no disclosure compelled in sex discrimination suit). See supra
1
note 262; Comment, supra note -13, at 1539-41.
265. See supra notes 236-41 and accompanying text. The quasi-judicial hearings are expressly excepted in eleven states; eighteen states expressly exclude judicial matters. Simon,
supra note 14, at 143. See ExcE ,IoNs, Supra zote 46, at 58-67; TYPEs, supra note '16, at 54-60.
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approach presupposes that tenure meetings should be open- a presumption
that would surely incur strong opposition from academia.26 e
The potential application of the Sunshine Law to certain university meetings creates a complex of conflicting interests that the existing statute is illequipped to resolve. The few statutofy exceptions do not address the issues
in education.27 It may be preferable to start with a broad statutory presumption of openness and allow the courts and legislature to react responsibly to
special circumstances. 2" Tennessee's statute followed this approach, and the
courts exempted all higher education. 269 In Florida, the judiciary has not resolved the central questions of the Sunshine Law's applicability to higher
education. Inconsistent judicial results, compounded by the sensitive policies
in conflict, demonstrate the need for legislative guidance in higher education.
A PROPOSED STATUTORY

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE

SUNSHINE LAw IN HIGHER EDUCATION

The Sunshine Law's ambiguous definitional prerequisites, "official actions,"
"board or commission," and "agency," have compromised its underlying
openness policy. Neither the legislature nor the judiciary have adequately
addressed the statute's applicability to higher education. 27 0 A balanced legislative solution is-the most appropriate approach in this problematic area.
Legislation creating a reasoned expectation that is enforceable and acceptable
to the universities could quell academic resistance to open meetings.2y7 University meetings should be open absent a specific statutory exception.2 7 2 To
accomplish these aims universities should be required to petition the circuit
court to close any meeting not specifically excepted 272 for constitutional
reasons.

2 4

266. Simon, supra note 14, at 105 (Florida university presidents believe certain meetings
should always be closed). R. O'NFiL, THE CouxTs, GOVERNMENT AND HIGHm EDUCATION 4-6
(1972) (suggests that student activism will decrease but faculties will remain persistent in
challenging the university structure).
267. See Hollow & Ennis, supranote 10, at 536, 543.
268. See Project, supra note 10, at 1195.
269. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
270. See Note, Government in the Sunshine: Judicial Application and Suggestions for
Reform, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 537, 552 (1974).
271. See The Independent Florida Alligator, Oct. 7, 1978, at 4 (statement of President
Marston) (the privacy right in conflict with the open meeting statute is willingly placed

before the court for proper determination).
272. Some statutes allow secret or "'executive" sessions of a meeting that would otherwise be open based on the subject matter discussed, while others allow secrecy during the
deliberation process on any matter. Comment, supra note 12, at 1172. For extensive review
of statutory exceptions, see Hollow & Ennis, supra note 10, at 534-38 n.34.
273. The statutory shifting of the burden is suggested as the only means short of severe
penalties, to fully implement the Sunshine Law. Other proposed solutions include: federal
preemption, judicial recognition of implied exceptions, extensive statutory exceptions, priority
statutes and repeal of conflicting laws. Edwards & Sherry, supra note 45, at 89-90.
274. rThe potential for a constitutional privacy exception is doubtful in light of the new
Florida Constitution Privacy Amendment that specifically states it will not limit the Sunshine
Law. See generally Comment, Government in the Sunshine Act: A Danger of Overexposure,
14 HARV. J. LEGis. 620, 642-45 (1977).
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In drafting a statute defining the scope of the Sunshine Law in higher
education, the legislature should include:
- A strong policy statement that the Sunshine Law applies to meetings
27 5
within the state post-secondary education system.
-A definition of those entities within higher education to which the
Sunshine Law applies, including entities created by express statute or rule,
and those appointed by 2 7authority
of any officer as defined in the Post
6
Secondary Education Act.
- Specific exclusion of those meetings the legislature determines must
be closed, and those that may be closed.2 7 7 (Suggestion: student and
personnel discipline, and tenure may be closed.)
- A requirement that the state institution of higher education petition
the circuit court in its jurisdiction, setting forth constitutional grounds
for an order closing its meetings. A court order shall not be required to
close:
a) any meeting excepted by statute, or
b) already adjudicated as constitutionally excepted from the open
meeting requirement.27
- A provision that any action taken by a collective body in closed
session 7shall
be void ab initio unless the required court order was ob2 9

tained.

- Authority for university staff attorneys to bring such petitions and a
280
provision for funding.
- A provision for the State Attorney General and Department of Legal
Services to respond to any petition and represent the public interest in

275. The Sunshine Law itself has no statutory policy statement. A policy statement could
reconcile the policy of university independence by including it in the statement.
276. FLA. STAT. ch. 240 (1981). By including any advisory body to executive officers the
question of an administrative officer's status as an agency is foreclosed.
277. These suggestions are not wholeheartedly endorsed. The competing interests are
so balanced that reasoned legislative determination should be acceptable to all. Other
suggested reasons in academia for closing meetings include: testing, copyright, patent, or
new research. The legislature may well affirm the original Sunshine Law and make no
exceptions for higher education. Such exceptions were rejected by the legislature when
enacting the Sunshine Law. See supra note 234. However, by specifically addressing universities the issue will at least be resolved.
278. As only constitutional rights will rebut the presumption of openness the number of
petitions to the Circuit Court should be contained. Further, this emphasizes the legislative
intent and may deter the judiciary from creating nonconstitutional exceptions. See Note,
supra note 270, at 553.
279. FLA. STAT. § 286.011(1) (1981). The present Sunshine Law renders the action void
upon judicial determination. By holding any action void ab initio the time lapse would
be eliminated and the closed sessions deterred. Seventeen states render void any action
taken in closed session. Simon, supra note 14, at 143. See generally Note, Invalidation as a
Remedy for Open Meeting Violations, 55 OR. L. REv. 519 (1976); Comment, Pennsylvania's
"Sunshine Law": Problems of Construction and Enforcement, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 491 (1975);
Note, The Iowa Open Meetings Act: A Right Without a Remedy?, 58 IowA L. REV. 210 (1972).
280. FLA. STAT. § 240.231 (1981), allows the university to pay costs of any civil action on
behalf of an official in the course of his duties. This money is to be paid from general university funds not committed elsewhere. Such a provision, when combined with the requirement that any petition to close a meeting be based on constitutional reasons, will
deter the universities from petitioning to close any meeting that does not involve closely
competing rights.
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open meetings, notwithstanding any 28other obligation of the Attorney
General to represent the state agencies. '
-Standing for both citizens and the Attorney General to enforce the
Sunshine Law and these provisions. Mandatory award of costs and fees if
the Sunshine Law is violated. 2
- Standing for both citizens and the Attorney General to later challenge
any adjudication allowing closed sessions by declaratory judgment in order
to prevent foreseeable stagnation in the law.u3
CONCLUSION

The policy of open government is important to preserve public confidence.
In order to fully inform the public, meetings at all levels of government including its agencies and state universities, should be open. Case law throughout the country indicates that citizens are attempting to enforce their right
of access to university meetings. The wide disparity among these cases demonstrates the difficulty the courts have had in balancing competing interests
with little legislative guidance.
Florida's judiciary has departed from the Sunshine Law's mandate to allow
only constitutional exceptions to the open meeting requirement. Such ad hoc
judicial determinations plague the whole body of law and prevent consistent
enforcement. To preserve the integrity of the Sunshine Law the legislature
should promptly define the open meeting requirement's scope in higher education and act to secure its enforcement.
CAROLINE LILLY BENSABAT

281. FLA. STAT. ch. 16 (1981), authorizes the Attorney General to defend all state agencies,
however, most state institutions of higher education have their own staff. Further, in Wood
v. Marston the State State Attorney General filed amicus curiae on behalf of the students,
and in Szymanski v. University of Fla. the Attorney General intervened as a party plaintiff
to challenge the university's dosing of the second dean search.
282. Currently only citizens have standing to enforce the Sunshine Law; consequently,

higher education suits are not frequent.
283. See FLA. STAT. ch. 52 (1981). A discretionary award of costs and attorney's fees shall
be available.
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